Pakistan sees India when they see SWAT

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124823898093171403.html
What goes around comes around. A fundamental learning that Pakistan seems to have forgotten as they allege “Indian Links” to militant activities in their country. Reproducing Mathew Rosenburg article in Wall Street Journal: Pakistan sees India when they see WSJ.

Surrounded by aides and fellow officers, a large map propped up behind him, Maj. Gen. Sajjad Ghani lays out the battle plan for Pakistan's Swat Valley. He details how the Pakistani army swept in from the south and north in a "double pincer." He motions his pointer at the towns and villages where the fighting was fiercest and explains how the militants eventually melted away in the face overwhelming firepower.

Most of this is a well-worn narrative of the battle for Swat until Gen. Ghani, the commander of the northern half of the valley, turns to the alleged Indian role in the fighting.The Taliban, he explains, is "being directed, commanded and controlled by some of our hostile intelligence agencies being controlled by our neighboring country."

In case you didn't get it, that's code for India. And he doesn't stop there. He calls the town of Matta, a major Taliban stronghold in Swat, the "Benares of terrorism," using the old name of Hinduism's holiest city, Varanasi.

To outsiders, such comments are easily dismissed as the unscripted remarks of a conspiracy-minded soldier who has spent a lifetime preparing to fight his country's larger and more powerful rival.

But spend enough time in Pakistan, and you'll hear it expressed over and over again by everyone from street-side tea vendors to university students to senior officials. Most who offer up the theory seem to genuinely believe it. They see the Taliban's advance in Pakistan as part of a larger Indian conspiracy to encircle the country by building ties to the U.S. and Afghanistan, never mind that the Taliban is fighting U.S. and Afghan forces.

"Some circles believe that the Indian consuls in Afghanistan, fully supported by the U.S., are creating mayhem and sabotaging peace in Pakistan," wrote the Daily Express, an Urdu-lanaguage newspaper, in a June 30 editorial. "The Pakistani army should come down hard on anyone who is playing in the hands of foreign powers, including Baitullah Mehsud," the nominal leader of the Pakistan Taliban.

Rarely is any evidence proffered or India directly named. The comments usually come off as ham-handed attempts to deflect from Pakistan's own failures, as India itself often is quick to blame a "foreign hand" in atrocities before there has even been time to gather evidence. (Sometimes, of course, the foreign hand is at play – witness Mohammed Ajmal Kasab's confession Monday in Mumbai.)

Ironically, Pakistan's blaming India for its problems in Swat may actually, and unintentionally, have served a useful purpose in the broader anti-Taliban push. The idea that fighting the Taliban is tantamount to fighting India appears to have helped drive a massive turnaround in Pakistani public opinion, giving the government and the army the backing it needs to aggressively fight the militants.

"We've externalized an internal problem," says a senior Pakistani official who's often been critical of the government's ambiguous relationship with Pakistan's myriad Islamist militant groups.
The official doesn't believe predominately Hindu India is backing one of the world's fiercest Islamist movements, calling the suggestion "nonsense." And he says there's no organized effort to paint the Taliban as India's proxy even though many officials and generals "really believe it."
Still, "it's helped at a time when we really need the help," he says.

Some of the shift in public sentiment away from the peace accord with the Taliban signed in February undoubtedly is due to the Taliban's brutal rule of Swat. One widely circulated video showed the militants flogging a teenage girl accused of having an improper relationship with a man.

The Taliban also began to move into neighboring districts, raising alarms among Pakistan's urban middle and upper classes, some of whom sympathize with the Taliban but few of whom want to actually be ruled by the militants.

But anti-India sentiment has clearly played a role in rallying the Pakistani public and, perhaps more important, the deeply nationalistic military to support a broad anti-Taliban offensive. Such sentiment, however, also suggests that Pakistan won't lead a full-scale clampdown on all the country's myriad Islamist militant groups, many of which had long been used by Pakistan as proxies in Afghanistan and India's part of Kashmir. It's not all Islamist militants that are the problem, the thinking goes, just those being used by our enemies.

That helps explain why many Pakistanis opposed the Taliban in Pakistan yet at the same time support, to some degree, the Afghan Taliban, which is seen as distinct. It also explains why the Afghan Taliban and its allies still rely on safe havens on the Pakistani side of the border.
In fact, ask a Pakistani civilian or military official what the biggest problem in the region is, and only the rare few tell you it's the Taliban. Most say it's the presence of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces next door.

Taliban: Loosing its Social and Idealogical base

In an earlier post http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2008/12/is-terror-political-problem.html, i had discussed terror and militancy being a social problem foremost. It is only when the conditions in the society favour radical thought do people and societies favour such radical and exteremist steps. Thus, weeding out terrorism involves striking at its social and idealogical roots to make an impact. It is a commonly accepted fact, that Taliban and Al Qaeda have recieved the patronage of the peoples of the frontier provinces in Pakistan and Afghanistan that has blunted the effects of the US, Pakistan and NATO forces. However, relentless fighting, harsh Sharia laws, belligerence and intransigence and relentless blood shed of the Taliban has started eating into its own social base amongst the people in FATA. Mathew Rosenburg and Zahid Hussain (Wall Street Journal) cover the tribes' dissent and anger with the Taliban.

PESHAWAR, Pakistan -- When the Taliban began filtering into Gul Khan Mehsud's town along the Afghan border nine years ago, residents offered food, shelter and ammunition.
"How could we turn them away? The Americans were killing them. We wanted them to fight," says the 38-year-old from South Waziristan, one of the tribal regions that border Afghanistan and arguably the Taliban's most important stronghold in Pakistan. "We thought the Taliban would help us."

People carry a man injured in a suicide bombing at a mosque Friday in the Upper Dir district, west of the Swat Valley in Pakistan. Military leaders in the country say they are hoping anger among residents at the Pakistan Taliban will help fuel an anti-militant campaign and a coming offensive.
Instead, Mr. Mehsud was forced from his home in South Waziristan earlier this year after the Pakistan Taliban, which grew out of the militants who fled the 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, accused one of his cousins of helping the U.S. plot missile strikes from drone aircraft.
Mr. Mehsud now lives with nearly two dozen relatives in two rooms in this city, the gateway to the tribal borderlands. "I didn't want to be shot," he says.
With Pakistan on the brink of taking its anti-militant campaign to the tribal areas on the restive border with Afghanistan, civilian and military leaders in Islamabad are banking on growing anger with the Pakistan Taliban among tribesmen such as Mr. Mehsud, whose Pashtun ethnic group straddles the frontier and lives in the core of the insurgency in both countries.
Popular support for the insurgents has undermined years of attempts to subdue the border areas, where the Taliban hold sway and al Qaeda operates openly. Residents who have fled report an intensifying reign of terror. The region is largely off limits to outsiders -- foreigners and Pakistanis alike -- and there are signs of growing disgust with the Taliban's hard-line tactics.
Pakistan's military hopes to channel that disenchantment behind its coming campaign in North and South Waziristan, which is likely to be grueling. An estimated 15,000 militants from the northwestern mountains of Pakistan and parts of eastern Afghanistan have massed in the area before an offensive expected to begin in the next month or two.
Anger at the Taliban in tribal areas mirrors a broader anti-Taliban sentiment across Pakistan that backed the military's recent offensive in the Swat Valley, a onetime vacation area overrun by the Taliban in the past two years.
The military launched its assault in Swat, which is roughly 100 miles from Islamabad, about a month ago after the Taliban violated a peace agreement that gave them control of the area.
Pakistan's top brass say the army has cleared militants from most of Swat, but there still are pockets of resistance in the valley and sporadic violence in areas around the region. On Friday, a suicide bomber killed at least 30 people attending afternoon prayers at a mosque in the Upper Dir district, a remote area to the west of Swat. According to Pakistani officials, there was no immediate claim of responsibility, but one local government official blamed the Taliban, saying it was likely in retaliation for the Swat offensive.

The tribal areas -- remote, mountainous and untamed by outside authority for centuries -- represent a far greater challenge. Pakistani intelligence officials say the top leaders of the Swat Taliban have retreated, along with hundreds of followers, to North and South Waziristan.
North and South Waziristan are part of the so-called Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a rugged region cut off physically and politically from the rest of the country. Unlike Pakistan's four main provinces, the region has historically been under only loose federal government control.
There still is broad popular support in the area for militants fighting U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Afghanistan. And the Pakistan Taliban hasn't lost its allure among the tens of thousands of people whose relatives were killed or homes were flattened in military attempts to reassert authority in the tribal areas.
"Each time there is badly aimed artillery firing or the Americans fire missiles, if one person is killed, all his brothers and sons and cousins join the Taliban," said Hazrat Muhammad, 36, who last year fled fighting in the Mohmand tribal area near South Waziristan.
Even among those, such as Mr. Muhammad, who say they now oppose the Taliban, there's deep distrust of the government, which has done little for the tribal areas since Pakistan was created six decades ago.
In social and economic indicators, the region trails the rest of Pakistan. Per-capita annual income is about $500 -- roughly half the national average -- and literacy hovers under 20%.
Rustam Shah Mohmand, a former official who served as top administrator for both Waziristans, said the people "don't want the Taliban. But they don't want the army. They want to go back to their old ways."
The old ways allowed Islamabad to govern through a network of moderate tribal elders, known as maliks. Pakistani law didn't apply to the tribal areas, and the army stayed out of the region.
The system, which originated more than a century ago when Britain ruled the subcontinent, was upended by the Taliban and al Qaeda after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Hundreds of maliks were killed or forced to flee, and the few government officials in the region brought to heel.
The army sent in soldiers in 2003, but they did little to restore civilian authority. A new generation of Taliban warlords filled the vacuum, banding together in 2007 to form the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and fight Islamabad.
The group's most powerful commanders are based in the Waziristans. Among them: Baitullah Mehsud, the nominal leader of the Pakistan Taliban.
In one indication of the growing anger at the Pakistan Taliban, a rival from within Mr. Mehsud's tribe is gathering fighters to challenge the commander.
"The government is an enemy," said Gul Khan Mehsud. "First the Taliban must go. Then the army should go," he said. Asked who would then govern the tribal areas, he replied, "We can work that out ourselves."

Why the Taliban’s going to win in Pakistan

Reproducing Aakar Patel's commentary on Sharia and Islam being the cornerstone, which will lead Taliban's Societal onquest of Pakistan, even if it is beaten Militarilly.
http://www.livemint.com/2009/05/21211703/Why-the-Taliban8217s-going.html

The Taliban cannot defeat Pakistan militarily. The Taliban will win because what they want is already being implemented by Pakistan

The Taliban will win in Pakistan. They are on the right side of the law. They are also on the right side of history. Last month, a video of Talibs whipping a 17-year-old girl for adultery upset Pakistanis, who thought it barbaric. It might be, but it is the law. The punishment for married adulterers in Pakistan is to “be stoned to death at a public place” (Ordinance 7 of 1979). Unmarried adulterers are to be “punished, at a public place; with whipping numbering one hundred stripes”.

Later in April, the world worried over Pakistan’s decision to enforce Shariah law in the district of Swat, being held by the Taliban. But Shariah is already in force in the whole of Pakistan; it is only being implemented selectively. What the Taliban are demanding is enforcement. Pakistanis might fear the Taliban but nobody opposes Islamic law. Speaking against the “ideology of Pakistan” means 10 years in jail (Penal Code 123a).
In Pakistan, defiling the Quran means life in prison. Speaking against the Prophet is an automatic death sentence (Penal Code 295c).
Under laws that president Zia-ul-Haq introduced, the maximum punishment for theft is amputation of hands. Muslims caught drinking face 80 lashes.
Under prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, founder of the liberal Pakistan People’s Party, parliament apostatized the entire Ahmedi sect, a group of Punjabi Muslims.
An Ahmedi “is not a Muslim for the purposes of the constitution or law” (Second Amendment, 1974). If Ahmedis refer to themselves as “Muslim”, or their prayer house as “masjid”, or recite the azaan (call for prayer), they shall be imprisoned for three years (Pakistan Penal Code 298B, 298C).
What happens to Pakistan’s liberal politicians when these laws are passed?
They have to disappear.
Also Read Aakar’s previous Lounge columns
Bhutto’s finance minister was the socialist, Mubashir Hasan. Every year, he leads the candle vigil at Wagah. His book, The Mirage of Power, is a detailed account of his four years as minister but makes no mention of the apostatization of the Ahmedis. He skips over the episode. Why? He is afraid to communicate his opposition because he might be lynched.
It is difficult to be secular in Pakistan. The man whose party surrendered at Swat was Asfandyar Wali, grandson of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Frontier Gandhi.
The Taliban cannot defeat Pakistan militarily. The Pakistan army will rout it because the Talibs have neither armour, nor artillery nor aircraft.
The Taliban will win because what they want is already being implemented by Pakistan.

On 23 December 1999, Pakistan’s supreme court banned the charging of interest on loans, deciding it was not Islamic. Effectively, this would shut down the banking system and switch off the economy. Pervez Musharraf, then president, got the court to appoint a committee to decide how to implement this ban. This has delayed the destruction of Pakistan’s economy, but not avoided it. In 1998, prime minister Nawaz Sharif moved the 15th Amendment to enforce Shariah. This would designate him Amir-ul-Momineen, commander of the faithful, like Mullah Omar. The Bill was passed by the lower house before being blocked in the senate by the small party of Bihari-UP migrants from India, the Muhajirs.
Urdu-speaking Muhajirs form the only secular party in Pakistan. Their base is Karachi, where they are up against four million Pashtun immigrants. Who are the Talibs? Ethnically, they are Pashtun, 15% of Pakistan’s population.
Many were students of a curriculum designed at Deoband, a school in Uttar Pradesh’s Saharanpur district. It was set up after the war of 1857, seen as the end of Muslim rule in India. Its purpose was to revive Islam by ridding it of the corruption of Hindu influence. It recognizes the jurist Abu Hanifa (who died in 765). The Jaish-e-Mohammad follows the Deobandi ideology.
Pakistan was founded by a man who didn’t really understand Islam. Mohammed Ali Jinnah was a South Mumbai Gujarati who spoke no Urdu or Arabic. He was a constitutionalist who did not understand the nature of the state he had founded. He was a Shia of the Sevener Ismaili Khoja sect. They are talented businessmen and good citizens, but Sunnis regard them as heretics. To widen his appeal, Jinnah converted to “regular” Twelver Shiism.
But that wasn’t good enough.
When he died in 1948, a year after Partition, his deputy, Liaquat Ali Khan, had him buried as a Sunni with a Deobandi maulvi leading his funeral prayer. Six months after Jinnah’s death, on 12 March 1949, Khan introduced the Objectives Resolution in the Pakistan assembly, which was legislating the new constitution. Pakistanis, Khan declared, would enjoy democracy, freedom and equality “as enunciated by Islam”. These words alarmed the assembly’s Hindu members, all Bengalis from East Pakistan. They said this was not what Jinnah had promised them. But Jinnah had been vague. And the Muslims in the assembly were able to point to instances where Jinnah had spoken clearly of Shariah law. The committee voted 21:10. All Muslims voting for; all Hindus against.
Khan assured the Hindus that they would not be discriminated against. He was assassinated in 1951. The discrimination would be written in later, incrementally and over time.
By law, only a Muslim may now be Pakistan’s president (Article 41-2) or prime minister (Article 91-4). Not that there are many non-Muslims left.
Pakistan is today 96% Muslim and unable to think on secular lines. Why are Pakistanis doing this to themselves?
B.R. Ambedkar speculated about this in 1946. “The Muslims have no interest in politics as such. Their predominant interest is religion” (Pakistan: The Partition of India, pages 232-233). All that the Muslim voter cared about, he wrote, was that the candidate “replace the lamps... (and) provide a new carpet for the masjid”. He added: “None of the secular categories of life have any place in the politics of (the) Muslim community and if they do find a place—and they must because they are irrepressible—they are subordinated to one and only one governing principle of the Muslim political universe, namely, religion.” Months later, Ambedkar began work on India’s secular constitution, which took force on 26 January 1950.

Till last year, Nepal was the only Hindu state on earth. The Chhetri (Kshatriya) dynasty ended with the republic of 2008.
Why was it a Hindu state? Because executive power flowed from a warrior king, as prescribed in the Hindu code, Manusmriti. But Nepal was Hindu only to that extent. Nothing else from Hindu texts could be applied because most of it is against the Universal Declaration Of Human Rights, just like Shariah is.
The religious state is utopian, and demands perfection. If we obey God fully, He will look after us. This is not the view of just the bearded Talib of Swat: the justices of the supreme court of Pakistan expect that blessings will be showered on their country after they skewer its economy.
Pakistan is in religious ecstasy. Like Iran, it will have to go through the process of full Islamization.
After this it will learn that there is no other way to run a modern state than as a secular democracy.

The Countdown to the end of Pakistan

7 months after my first story on Pakistan (2nd October 2008) and 13 posts later, its time for the final countdown to begin on curtains to the nation state of Pakistan. At the outer limit, experts give Pakistan 6 months before it calls in international troops to help control the fundamentalist Taliban from running over the state.

To quote David Kilcullen, adviser to David Petraeus, commander of the US Central Command (that oversees operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan):
Pakistan is today a nation without a political gyroscope. Its political leadership is at war with itself and its army thinks India is top enemy while the Taliban steadily inch towards territorial control. In fact, its army elite are inclined in favour of the Taliban. When the radicals do take over the reins in Islamabad, it would be a unique example of a nation handing over the levers of state power to non-state actors.

The spectre is fearsome for India and the international community with around 100 nuclear war-heads within reach of the Taliban forces. Taliban have violated peace agreements with the Islamabad governments at will and have extended their run from FATA to Swat and Burner, which is 100 miles away from Islamabad. There is no doubt that Taliban advances are focussed on running over the whole state of Pakistan. Only if you are an individual called Asif Ali Zardari (AAZ) would you be hallucinating “all’s well in Pakistan”.
On one end, AAZ is talking about military and economic aid to the tune of $30 billion to finance his “efforts” against “war on terror”. On the other, AAZ effectively ratified the government's deal with the Taliban Monday by signing a bill that imposes Islamic law in Swat on 13th April 2009. Pakistani officials have touted the deal, reached in February, as a way to restore peaceful order in the bloodied region -- which lies just a few hours' drive from the capital -- and halt the Taliban's advance. Striking peace deals with some Taliban factions is part of Pakistan's broader strategy to counter the militants. The government's logic is that such accords can exploit the groups' fractious nature; one enemy can be neutralized with a peace deal while another is defeated on the battlefield. The deals also have been struck when the army has struggled to overcome militants. In Swat, about 3,000 militants pushed four times as many soldiers out of the valley in 18 months of fighting, leaving some 1,500 people dead.Nearly all the peace accords reached in the past few years in areas near the Afghan border, where the Taliban are strongest, have collapsed. Often they have left the militants more powerful. A similar deal in Swat fell apart last year after the Taliban renewed attacks on Pakistani forces.

The deal was counter productive if anything and served in strengthening the militant’s base for war in Swat Valley. The number of militants in the valley swelled to double the number at the end of last year. The Taliban's actions since the new peace deal was unveiled have alarmed Washington, where officials fear that Swat will become an effective launching pad for expansion into Pakistan's more densely populated plains. "This is a rest stop for the Taliban, it's nothing more," said a U.S. official in Washington.

On the ideological plane, the idea of Pakistan has ceased to be meaningful; it is a failed state led by reckless elite who could not care less. The fate is sealed more or less and the way it looks from here is that Taliban would run over the plains of Pakistan and establish a parallel government in the country-sides while the federal government would be confined to cities. Suicide attacks, terror training camps and bombings would increase as militants would find their first legitimate lands where Sharia laws would be imposed. A US-International attempt at purging Pakistan would result in a bloody civil war. The ISI- Pakistan Army loyalties would be tested and eventually Pakistan would emerge as a war devastated economy which for other political reasons would have to be split into three countries. The first would be the confederation of states NWFP, FATA and parts of Balochistan. In spirit, this would be exactly like Afghanistan and would continue to be the hot bed of terrorism. The other two states would be Punjab and Sindh. As far as AAZ is concerned, I see him to be a victim of an assassination much like his late wife. History would forget and forgive him for failing his opportunity as the last president of Pkaistan who could have altered the fate of the country.

'Pakistan in danger of fracturing into Islamist fiefdom'

Reprint from Times of India's article by the same name.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan-in-danger-of-fracturing-into-Islamist-fiefdom/articleshow/4412829.cms

With extremist elements gaining ground every passing day, Pakistan is in an imminent danger of disintegrating into a fiefdom controlled by Islamist warlords, having "disastrous" implications, a media report has said.

"It's a disaster in the making on the scale of the Iranian revolution," an unnamed intelligence official with long experience in Pakistan was quoted as saying by the McClatchy newspaper.

There is little hope to prevent nuclear-armed Pakistan from disintegrating into a fiefdom controlled by Islamist warlords and terrorists, who would then pose a far greater threat to the US than those in Afghanistan, intelligence officials keeping a close watch on the situation in the region told the paper.

They said Pakistan's government is in the danger of being overrun by Islamic militants and the development of such a situation could be dangerous not only for the US but also for the entire region.

"Pakistan has 173 million people and 100 nuclear weapons, an army which is bigger than American army, and the headquarters of al-Qaida sitting in two-thirds of the country which the government does not control," David Kilcullen, a counterinsurgency consultant to the Obama administration was quoted as saying.

"The implications of this are disastrous for the US," he said. Unlike Afghanistan, which is a backward, isolated, landlocked place, officials said Pakistan is a developed state with a major Indian Ocean port and ties to the outside world, especially the Persian Gulf that Afghanistan and the Taliban never had.

Another Pentagon advisor told McClatchy that Pakistan's government in the next 10 years would be overrun by Islamic militants.

"The place is beyond redemption," he was quoted as saying. "I don't see any plausible scenario under which the present government or its most likely successor will mobilize the economic, political and security resources to push back this rising tide of violence," the advisor said.

"I think Pakistan is moving towards a situation where the extremists control virtually all of the countryside and the government controls only the urban centers," he said.

The report said such a pessimistic view of Pakistan's future has been bolstered by Islamabad's surrender this week of areas outside the frontier tribal region to Pakistan's Taliban movement for the first time.

Growing militant infiltration of Karachi, the nation's financial centre and the industrial and political heartland province of Punjab, in part to evade US drone strikes in the tribal belt, also strengthens the view, it said.

Zardari's begging bowl

In over 11 previous posts, I have written on the central issue plaguing Pakistan- An inept and corrupt leadership (sans influence and control) playing puppet to army/ISI powers playing puppet to a larger and high orthodox Islamic order (Taliban being one of the faces of this front). It is indeed a shame that the world watches as Pakistan deteriorates into an Islamic Anarchy. The human, economic, trade and infrastructure indexes in the Pakistan are retrogressing to put it mildly. For a long tiem now, it has been running on IMF and American aid. However the spends have not shown any "developmental" returns.

While Zardari goes about begging for aid from the developed economies, there is little he can show as real time development during his 1.5 year tenure. Forget the state, a justice for his wife's assassination is pending. Zardari has proven to be a very weak and vacillating leader of a country, which at this time needs a visionary, dare- all statesman leader more than anything. The greatest acheivements that Zardari can talk about is his tenure as far as Pakistan is concerned is the success of his aid accumulation efforts. US has aided him, so has the IMF, so has China and now Japan. $1 billion aid to Pakistan has been promised by Japan and US to support economic reforms and developmental assistance.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/US-Japan-pledge-1bn-each-to-Pak/articleshow/4412576.cms
Furthermore, Zaradari has set claims to such aids as a measure (pay back) for Pakistan aiding the "war against terror" on its soil. According to Zardari "If we win, you win. If we loose, you loose" can be construed as a thinly veiled persuation tactic.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Zardari-seeks-aid-like-Marshall-Plan/articleshow/4412121.cms
On a subject such as winning and loosing, Zardari prefers silence on why he would agree to sharia laws and let Taliban "rule" a part of the Pakistani territory. It only proves a complete breakdown of the security systems in Pakistan and the helplessness of Islamabad in managing this muck that they have gotten themselves in.

As if a $7.5 billion civilian aid and $3 billion military assistance is not enough, Pakistan’s envoy to the US Husain Haqqani has sought $30 billion under Marshall Plan to fight Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.$30 billion is far less than the current stimulus packages being doled out to banks and other US companies. “Despite the economic issues that the world is facing, the cost of a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan is going to be minuscule (compared) to the bailouts being given to American car companies and AIG (American International Group),” Haqqani was quoted.Kerry-Lugar bill has proposed tripling of the non-civilian aid to Pakistan to $1.5 billion a year, he said Pakistan needs $5 billion a year for the next five years from the US and its allies to build local law enforcement of about 100,000 men, strengthen counterinsurgency against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and persuade average citizen that the US-led war on extremism is Pakistan’s war and essential for the country’s survival.

It is baffling as to how such huge aid moneys are routinely routed to Pakistan, even while western states express shock, anger, grief and admonishment at Islamabad's mis-governance.
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=6898150&page=1. As of 8th April 2009, Taliban broke the "peace deal" between themselves and the government that was drawn in March, 2009. As of 10th April, Taliban fighters were barely 60 miles (97km) north-west of Islamabad.
http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20090090259
http://www.zeenews.com/South-Asia/2009-04-09/522070news.html
http://www.livemint.com/2009/04/10000833/Time-distance-and-Taliban.html

It is time for the international forum to see beyond Islamabad's diversionary tactics and be satisfied with the aid lumpsums that they deliver to Islamabad. There is a real problem out there and it is for the average Pakistani citizen that the international community now needs to react and call for a broader military action in Pakistan. Else the whole country is in a real danger of descending into lawless fiefdoms, much the same as Afghanistan fate.

Is Pakistan dividing again

Over the last 5 months, i have written about 8 posts on Pakistan emphasizing that the current turn of events are only stages of what could be the end of the nation state of Pakistan.

http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2009/02/why-wont-pakistan-make-it-as-nation_17.html

http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2009/02/did-obama-force-zardaris-hand.html

http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2009/02/why-wont-pakistan-make-it-as-nation.html

http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2008/12/why-wont-pakistan-make-it-as-nation_20.html

http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2008/12/why-wont-pakistan-make-it-as-nation_18.html

http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2008/12/why-wont-pakistan-make-it-as-nation.html

http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2008/12/next-terror-attack-on-us-will-originate.html

http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2008/11/us-suspects-kashmir-based-group-behind.html

This post is a reproduction of an article by Shaun Gregory, former British high commissioner to Pakistan.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Sunday-TOI/All-That-Matters/Losing-integrity-Is-Pakistan-dividing-again/articleshow/4206486.cms

There is a school of thought which has long argued that the creation of Pakistan in 1947 was a geographical, ethnic, cultural, economic, and political artifice sewn and held together only by the weak thread of a questionable religious homogeneity, and that consequently the project of Pakistan would eventually be torn apart by its own contradictions.

History may well record that the abject surrender of Swat in a phoney ‘peace deal’ marked an important stepping stone on the path to Pakistan’s destruction. 

While the weak and hapless Zardari/Gilani government continues to waste precious political capital on PPP infighting and avoidable confrontation with Nawaz Sharif, to the west of the Indus river dynamics are unfolding which have placed Pakistan’s integrity once more in question.

Since 2001, the Pakistan Army and ISI have been playing a dangerous game in providing sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban in the Pashtun areas of Northern Balochistan and in the FATA, in the expectation that Mullah Omar would orchestrate a comeback in Afghanistan, displace the Karzai regime or any of its western-backed successors, force NATO from the region, and reverse India’s growing influence in Afghanistan.

 In early 2009, this strategy appears to be working. The Afghan Taliban are influential across all but the most northerly areas of Afghanistan and a peace deal of some sort with Mullah Omar is predicted this year or next. 

Pakistan has, however, entered a Faustian pact with Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura, and the darker implications of that bargain have only now begun to dawn on Pakistan’s ruling elite. 

As the Afghan Taliban have regained power and momentum from sanctuaries in Pakistan, they have also created and driven the context for the emergence and evolution of virulent forms of Pakistani militancy and terrorism, both in Pakistan’s Pashtun areas and across Pakistan. 

These dynamics have been reinforced by the Pakistan army/ISI’s continued embrace of Punjabi terrorists, and by the military focus of the US-led war on terror which has fuelled radicalisation on both sides of the Durand Line. 

In this context tribal armies in the FATA have mutated into new forms of radical extremist groups such as Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP and Fazlullah’s TNSM. Al-Qaida has re-emerged and re-established something of its global reach, foreign fighters from as far as Algeria, European diasporas, western China and the Philippines have once again poured into the region, and the huge expansion of largely Saudi and locally-funded madrassas has ensured a continual supply of young Afghans and Pakistanis ready to die for the militant cause. 

The Pakistan army and ISI have presided over this rising tide of terrorism and religious extremism in the expectation that they could achieve their aims in Afghanistan through the Afghan Taliban while keeping control of Pakistani militancy and terrorism on their own side of the border. 

In the wake of the bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad in September 2008, and of the escalation of terrorist violence in Pakistan’s cities which preceded it, that calculation has proven disastrously wrong. 

Given the perilous situation in which the Pakistani state now finds itself, the question of why the Pakistan army/ISI has still not thrown its lot in with the US and NATO and unleashed the full force of the Army and the ISI against the Afghan Taliban, the tribal militants, and al-Qaida, requires an answer. 

Only two arguments make any sense: either the Pakistan Army-ISI is unwilling to do so or it is unable to do so. If the former, then that can only be because the Army-ISI still believes it can contain the militancy and terrorism within Pakistan. 

If this is the case, then one wonders why the Army-ISI continues to think that and how many more Marriotts on the push side, and what western incentives on the pull side will it take before the Army and ISI make a decisive break with past policy? 

More gravely for Pakistan, for its neighbours, and for the West, the other possibility is that the Pakistan Army and ISI may genuinely have reached the practical limits of their ability to control militancy and terrorism. 

Pakistan has committed up to 120,000 troops to the FATA region and since September 2008 has not been able to make a substantive impact in Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies. 

Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura is understood, through a decentralised command structure and with the support of al-Qaida, to broadly control the tribal militants in Pakistan, such as the TTP and TNSM, which pose the most direct threat to the state of Pakistan. 

Mullah Omar and the Pakistan Army-ISI are, thus, locked in a fearful stalemate: Mullah Omar checks the power of Pakistan’s militants and holds them back from escalating violence against the Pakistani state, and in return the Pakistan Army-ISI continues the support and protection of Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura and pays lip-service to western demands for tough action against the Afghan Taliban. 

Either way, the Pashtun areas of Pakistan are beyond the reach of the Pakistani state and it is difficult to see that they can be recovered. 

The situation in Swat, thus, stands as an expression of a larger crisis of state legitimacy which for all practical purposes will likely see another piece of Pakistan break away. 

Why wont Pakistan make it as a nation (Part V)

I suppose i should now change the headline of this series of posts. Over the last 3 months, i have in a series of blogs stressed upon the dire straits that Pakistan is in today. By all means it is a crumbling nation imploding under its own fanatic religious idealogies.

http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2009/02/why-wont-pakistan-make-it-as-nation.html

http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2008/12/why-wont-pakistan-make-it-as-nation_20.html

http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2008/12/why-wont-pakistan-make-it-as-nation_18.html

http://newspaper-posts.blogspot.com/2008/12/why-wont-pakistan-make-it-as-nation.html

Two days back, Pakistan Government has ceeded the control of Swat valley to Taliban. The mechanics include introduction of Sharia laws (Islamic Laws) in the beleagured Malakand area and a temporary suspension of military activities in the region. The direct accruals out of this development:

1. Taliban now have a safe haven/province, a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. For the first time, we have a terrorist state on the global map!

2. Taliban is discomfortingly close to Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is well within a hands lenght of the Taliban Extremists!

3. Even as Taliban celebrate this event by rallies around Swat, this is Pakistan government's deepest and darkest hour when they are no longer able to retain control of their provinces.

4. Islamabad's faltering military campaign (which US pays for) is tentatively put on hold and Taliban have agreed for a tentative ceasefire.

According to the terms of the agreement, "all non-Shari'a laws" have been abrogated in Malakand. Security forces "will only act if fired upon by militants." And if the "writ of the state is restored," the army's 12,000 troops will be withdrawn from the valley. The agreement, enjoys the support of President Asif Ali Zardari.

To quote Time magazine on a source within the Pakistan Government, " government's acceptance of the [sharia] courts was an attempt to blunt efforts of the Taliban to woo Swat residents frustrated by the ineffective judiciary. The Taliban was trying to take advantage of the local movement and desire for a judicial system". Thus by putting the Sharia into prcatise the goverment is trying to appease its citizen in the valley, who have been frustrtade by Pakistan's venal courts and judiciary systems. This appeasement would stear the suppoorters away from the jihadist, isolate the militants and with the help of local leaders restore peace.

Under the Islamic laws, bombing of girl schools, subjgation of women, public beheadings, assassinations and Taliban courts to dispense justice would now be the order of the land in Malakand province. This follows a break down on the judicial system to dispense justice to citizens in the province. Sources with Malakand provinces have been quoted saying Islamabad
does not have sufficient force to defeat the Taliban and foreign fighters based in the autonomous tribal areas along the Afghan border and thus needs to negotiate with local militant groups in nearby areas like Swat to isolate the renegade hardliners in the tribal sanctuaries.

Once a popular tourist destination, Swat has over the past two years seen more than 1,500 people killed, close to 200 schools destroyed and girls' education banned, scores of beheadings and kidnappings, and more than 100,000 people driven from their homes.

Analysts and Observers say that this is a dangerous gamble and specially so with Islamabad which has limited control on its own defence establishments! Allowing Taliban a breather would allow them to regroup and push more at a later date which would not only endanger Pakistan but also have grave implicatiosn for India, US and the world.

My belief is that this is the beginning of the end game for Pakistan. Under US and iunternational pressure, Pakistan may have to take military action against the Taliban in the province. By allowing Taliban to regroup now, it will face a stronger foe. Chances are the situation will implode from within and Taliban will take a lot that is "Pakistan" down with it. An "Afghanistan" fate awaits Pakistan in the near future and the recent gambit has irrecoverably put Pakistan on the one way to destruction.

Did Obama force Zardari's hand?

There are Republican views in US, that Obama's opening few days havent been any great success. This is to do with the $800 billion stimulus plan that Obama has been trying to push forward. There also is some confusion about a few members in Obama's Cabinet.

However, i give Obama a high score in the first 20 days in office. In terms of action in the subcontinent, Obama has gone about the task clinically, forcing Pakistan's admission on the 26/11 case. From a state of denial ("non state actors") to "stop and go" action (house arrests, crack down on terrorist camps) to vacillating stand points (we also trust China) to a full burst anti Taliban stand (taliban is trying to take over Pakistan); the leadership of Pakistan has given the world a myriad full screen matinee script worth digging discussions after discussions. However, the latest stand taken by Asif Ali Zardari in admitting Pakistan inability to restrict Taliban's power on its soil and a "mea culpa" (with conditions and demands of evidence) is the sign of hard diplomacy paying off. While India mounted the heat on Pakistan in terms of diplomacy (directed to ostracism of Pakistan); one feels that a major reason behind the Pakistani turn around was growing US pressure. Interestingly the game of twisting arms was played on one simple plank: economic aid. It is plain and clear that the economy of Pakistan today lives by the US aids and a failure on this part would have plunged Pakistan into civil unrest and turmoil.

Zardari on his behalf has probably taken the first significant step in what should be seen as purging Pakistan of the Taliban Carcinogen. We also know that the drone attacks on Taliban, which were being opposed by the Pakistani leadership, was actually happening from Pakistani airbases and under the leadership's knowledge. Todays newspaper speaks about a missile attack killing 10 Talibanis. It is becoming increasingly clear that Obama is under no mood to relent as far as wiping Taliban is concerned! Under pressure to support the economy and its survival, Zardari now tows Obama's lines.

If Zardari is able to get American aid to exorcise Taliban Influence on its lands, he would be doing Pakistan's future a great deal of good. I sincerely hope, that he is able to travel the distance without falling to the traggic fate of his wife. Somewhere between Obama, Zardari and Taliban lies the fate of Pakistan.